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This paper investigates emission control areas (ECAs) as an instrument to address external costs from
shipping. Though ECAs have been researched in a versatile manner by scholars of economics, manage-
ment and policy studies, rather less attention has been paid to the complex multi-level and multi-actor
institutional environments into which ECAs are implemented Yet, the decisions of shipping actors re-
garding the improvement of their safety and environmental performance can be both enhanced and
constrained by the ’rules of the game’ embedded within respective institutional frameworks. The paper
investigates the case of the Baltic ECA in order to explore the interplay between the existing and emerg-
ing arrangements for shipping externalities governance. Methodologically it draws upon the instrumen-
tation approach, which conceptualises governance instruments as policy implementation choices and
reveals which relations between the actors involved into the governance process they imply. The study
explores the origin, content and power implications of technical instruments associated with the goal
of enhanced environmental protection of the Baltic Sea. It aims to assess how the new instrument of
ECAs can play itself out in terms of externalities governance. The paper concludes with a discussion of
the role of ECAs as a potential enabling environment for quality shipping.
c© SEECMAR | All rights reserved
1. Introduction
Awareness of the negative environmental impacts of global
maritime transport has risen over the last two decades (Mitchell,
1994; Tan, 2006; Corbett, 2007; OECD, 2011). In relation
to this, questions on the mitigation of adverse environmental
effects from shipping have gained more attention from poli-
cymakers, shipping industry and other societal actors, includ-
ing academic researchers. Despite shared understanding in the
shipping sector that environmental quality improvements do pay
off in the medium and long terms, the challenge of balancing
safety, environmental protection and economic sustainability
when trying to preserve competitive advantage often reduces
shipping companies’ motivation to quality improvement in the
short-term (Alderton and Winchester, 2002; Pawlik et al., 2012;
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Cheng and Choy, 2013). Thus, maritime transport is an exam-
ple of a private service with public externalities.
Wide recognition of the negative effects of vessel-induced
pollution on ecosystems, human health and commercial activi-
ties, brought it into the realm of public regulation (Tan, 2006;
Roe, 2012). The cornerstones of statutory regulation are laid
down in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS 1982) and the International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973/1978),
as well as in specified legal instruments for different types of
pollution on the international, regional and national levels. The
legal architecture includes both framework instruments on ma-
rine environment protection and regulatory provisions setting
emission standards, prohibiting certain operations or providing
penalties in case of polluting discharges.
In addition to public governance, a number of private regu-
latory arrangements and voluntary schemes were developed by
the shipping industry actors in cooperation with each other, as
well as in collaboration with public sector and non-governmental
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organisations (NGOs) (Wuisan et al., 2012; Yliskyla¨-Peuralahti
and Gritsenko, 2014). Such self-regulatory measures are mainly
seen as a complement to conventional command-and-control
regulations (Steurer, 2010), increasing the potential of the whole
governance system to contribute to avoiding market failure. Yet,
the effectiveness of private and public measures taken sepa-
rately or in combination remains an empirically open question.
Apart from being multi-leveled and multi-actor, arrange-
ments for governing shipping externalities also demonstrate dif-
ferences from one locality to another. Designation of some
parts of the world ocean to particularly sensitive sea areas
(PSSA), emission control areas (ECA), more stringent regula-
tion at supranational (e.g., European Union) and local (e.g., the
Californian Coast) levels resulted in significant spatial variabil-
ity of institutional frameworks. Attempts to resolve the environ-
mental problems created by global shipping by differentiating
the rules on a spatial basis require special attention. On the one
hand, they urge the globalized and inherently trans-boundary
multinational shipping industry to diversify their strategies in
order to adapt to special operational environments. On the other
hand, they pose fundamental questions regarding the role of
regulation in addressing trans-boundary environmental concerns.
This paper seeks to clarify how designation of ECAs can af-
fect externalities governance in shipping. Drawing upon the in-
strumentation approach (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007), gov-
ernance instruments are conceptualised here as policy imple-
mentation choices, which allow for analysing the types of gov-
ernance that are emerging in ECAs. On the basis of empiri-
cal investigation of the Baltic ECA, the paper concludes that
to date governance structure of the Baltic ECA is heavily fo-
cused upon states and public forms of governance, neglect-
ing the ever-growing private governance, which is manifested
through the development of green shipping practices and cor-
porate social responsibility initiatives. It claims that in their
present form ECAs have only limited potential for uncoupling
economic growth and negative environmental impacts in ship-
ping. Eventually, the paper speculates on the conditions un-
der which ECAs can contribute to shipping externalities gover-
nance by specifying the shipping governance structure in terms
of mechanisms, instruments and implementation entities in a
contextually-sensitive manner.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the
problem of external cost governance in maritime transport. Sec-
tion 3 presents the method of the study. Section 4 reports on
research results for the case of Baltic ECA. Section 5 discusses
the findings in the broader research context and concludes.
2. Maritime Transport and the Problem of External Cost
Governance
Maritime transport is a constant source of environmental
risks (Asariotis and Benamara, 2012; Corbett et al., 2007; Kuro-
nen and Tapaninen, 2009). In tandem with the growing inten-
sity of shipping, its contribution to global climate change and
a wide range of polluting emissions and discharges into water,
the atmosphere and shorelines is growing accordingly. The neg-
ative spillovers of shipping as an economic activity upon third
parties in the form of negative environmental impacts have been
accurately conceptualised as externalities (DeSombre, 2006;
Kalli et al., 2012; Lun, Lai, and Cheng, 2013; Ng and Song,
2010).
The term externality comes from economic literature, where
it is used to describe effects of human actions external to the ac-
tor, and is usually classified as a special case of market failure.
In the process of social interaction, externalities occur when-
ever some actors do not take account of the consequences of
their actions on others (Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962). En-
vironmental externality is a special case of externalities, which
arises when production and/or consumption have environmen-
tal effects that negatively affect consumers, but are not compen-
sated through the market mechanisms. In the case of shipping,
harmful effects range from negative health effects for people
confronted with emissions (e.g., disease, low quality of life) to
negative business effects for activities bound up with the good
ecological state of the environment (e.g., tourism and fisheries)
and they are not fully borne by the polluter, nor passed to the
end consumer, so the total cost is larger than the private cost.
From a social science point of view, externalities are an indica-
tor of collective action problems.
The negative environmental externalities, especially those
from multi-actor and trans-boundary activities such as ship-
ping, constitute a challenge in terms of governance. Thus in
public policy research the central question associated with the
study of negative externalities is: ”what are the policy options
available to resolve the problems that externalities create?” This
question has two interconnected facets: (a) externalities cost
and its calculation; and (b) actions by government and market
forces aimed at their internationalisation. In public governance
there are at least three classical solutions to externalities prob-
lem: (1) introduction of taxation equal to the size of externality
cost, (2) establishment of property rights and (3) direct govern-
ment command-and-control regulation (standards and charges
or standards and permits) (Cornes, 1996).
The first solution - government regulation and taxation -
is highly debated in the light of market self-regulatory capac-
ity. The main challenge of the second solution is the need
for a transparent and clear property rights system, low trans-
action costs and complete information about the transaction for
both sides, which prove to be difficult to ensure. Finally, the
third solution - a regulatory solution based on setting standards
and either a charge for incompliant behaviour or set a permit
scheme - is criticized on the grounds that it does not address the
problem, but rather provides an end-of-the-pipe solution to the
consequences, neither does it allow dealing with inefficiencies,
since the cost of externality is not addressed per se. A lack of
enforcement capacities within the states (not fully democratic
and accountable political system, corruption), or lack of author-
ity in trans-boundary (situations in which ’neither market nor
states’ (Ostrom, 1994) have the capacity to enforce regulation
due to trans-boundary gaps, such as in maritime transport) un-
dermine the three classical solutions (Bo¨rzel and Risse, 2010).
In addition to public intervention, externalities can be addressed
through private voluntary action, e.g., in shipping through the
development of green practices within the shipping companies
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(Lai et al., 2011). Yet, this solution based on self-regulation re-
quires credible future commitments and trust among the actors
that their actions will strengthen rather than undermine their
market position.
Shipping represents an interesting case for speculations about
collective action and externalities governance. Though ship-
ping externalities have been addressed through a variety of tech-
nical and regulatory instruments embedded within international,
regional and national laws and conventions (Hyva¨ttinen and
Hilde´n 2004; Psaraftis and Kontovas 2010; Tan 2006), the en-
forcement rates of global shipping regulation are poor (Rodrigue
et al., 2009). Governments are not only unwilling to enforce
regulation on safe, secure and environmental shipping, but also
lack the capacity to provide adequate measures. Limitations on
maritime transport governability constitute a significant obsta-
cle to compliance provision.
Maritime transport can be conceptualized as a classical case
for ”involuntary non-compliance” (Bo¨rzel and Risse, 2010). As
a result, neither innovation nor regulation alone has been able
to ensure the quality of shipping (Haralambides, 1998; Shi-
nohara, 2005). Quality shipping is defined in this research as
maritime transportation activities with a special focus on safety
and environmental protection, aiming at a high standard of op-
erational performance and economic sustainability throughout
the vessel’s lifecycle (Gritsenko, 2014). This definition implies
that externalities governance is a part of a comprehensive pro-
gramme for delivering quality in shipping.
Where the classical theory predicted the ”tragedy of the
commons” (Hardin, 1968), Ostrom (2012) proposed an alterna-
tive view on externalities governance in trans-boundary, multi-
leveled and multi-actor settings. Her research questioned the
conventional theory due to (1) lack of empirical support in small-
to medium-size environmental social dilemmas; and (2) ex-
istence of multiple benefits from emission reduction that ac-
tors may want to take into account. Ostrom’s findings suggest
that the capacity of states to implement sustainability policies
should not be considered as the only factor shaping the policy
output. Whereas globalisation poses considerable challenges
to provide the credible threat of costly legislation, monitor-
ing, and enforcement with severe punishment, actions of pri-
vate actors at small- and medium-scale may contribute to the
governance of negative environmental externalities, including
the case of shipping. ECAs can be seen as such medium-scale
frameworks, thus, they have the potential to resolve collective
action problems. Yet, little academic insight was provided as
regards mechanisms of maritime transport externalities gover-
nance in the ECAs.
Since traditional maritime governance has been acknowl-
edged as ineffective and Roe (2012) speaks of ’maritime gov-
ernance failure’, the governance of environmental externalities
in maritime transport constitutes a research subject of particu-
lar interest. This paper aims at filling in this gap and providing
an investigation of the governance of shipping externalities in
the Baltic Sea region (BSR), which is one of the ECAs desig-
nated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The
improvement of shipping quality is among the biggest chal-
lenges posed by the current economic and environmental sit-
uation, therefore research on the mechanisms that allow the
internalising of the negative environmental externalities from
shipping has relevance not only on the regional, but also on the
global scale.
3. Instrumentation Approach to Governance
Governance is, without exaggeration, a ’buzzword’ (Jessop,
1998), a contested and ’fashionable’ concept which ’stretched
beyond any useful meaning’ (Benz and Dose, 2010; Porta and
Keating, 2013, 37; Roe, 2012). ”In generic terms, governance
can be defined as the process of steering society and the econ-
omy through collective action” (Torfing et al., 2013, p.11). The-
reby governance research highlights that there is no single ac-
tor, institution or source of authority that defines and steers
quality in shipping, but there is instead a plurality of policy
arrangements, understood here as ”the substance and the organ-
isation of policy domains in terms of policy discourses, coali-
tions, rules of the game and resources” (Arts et al., 2006, p.94).
Thus, in its essence the concept of governance comes back to
the fundamental problem of the role of the state and the ”divi-
sion of labor” between public and private sectors in policymak-
ing.
The study of governance is tightly connected to how gov-
ernance is conceptualised. If governance is a network, it can
be studied by means of network analysis, if a discourse, by dis-
course analysis, if a process, process-tracing can be employed,
etc. Among other approaches, governance can be analysed us-
ing the instrumentation approach developed by Lascoumes and
Le Gales (2007). Interest in public policy instrumentation within
governance research has grown over the last years (Hood 2007;
Bache 2010; Halpern 2010; Kassim and Le Gale`s 2010; Heid-
breder 2011; Knol 2011). One of the reasons for this exponen-
tial growth is that this approach allows researchers to account
for both governance structure and process by focusing on policy
instruments as indicators of both ”who governs” and ”how gov-
erns” dimensions (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007, p.15). Dif-
fering from a functionalist view on the governance instruments,
the instrumentation approach seeks to understand the relation-
ship between the (public) regulator and the regulated entity by
exploring the origin, content and power implications of techni-
cal instruments.
Instrumentation analysis begins with identification of gov-
ernance instruments. Once instruments are listed, for each in-
strument one can establish a number of properties: (1) target;
(2) implementing body; (3) governance mode; (4) governance
mechanism (Table 1).
Conceptualising instruments as policy implementation choi-
ces, the instrumentation approach allows one to study the emer-
gence of new instruments as an indicator for proliferation of
new relations between the actors involved in the governance
process. Thus, instruments open a unique perspective for un-
derstanding governance arrangements. The principal advantage
of the instrumentation approach in governance research is that
it allows the de-coupling collective action from any particular
institutional form of governance, be it state, civil society or net-
works. The instrumentation research of governance eventually
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Table 1: Conceptual framework for instrumentation analysis
Target Implementing body
Governance mode Governance mechanism
Who is the target of this 
instrument? Who is 
supposed to be governed? 
Who’s action does this 
instruments seeks to 
change?
Who is supposed to 
implement this instrument? 
Who governs?
What is the locus of the 
governance process? Is it 
hierarchical governance 
(typically between state 
and citizens), self-
governance (outside the 
purview of government) or 
co-governance (joint 
effort)?
How does this instrument 
govern? By virtue of which 
mechanisms is the action 
supposed to be changed? 
Does the instrument foresee 
introduction of standards, 
procedures, monitoring of 
activities etc.?
Source: Authors
aims at showing how the societal approach to managing issues
of common interest can be balanced given the institutional com-
plexity manifested through diverse instrument choices.
4. Governing External Cost of Shipping in the Baltic ECA
4.1. Introducing an ECA in the Baltic Sea Region
The instrument of emission control areas (ECAs) was intro-
duced by the IMO as a part of progressive emission reduction
policy within the framework of the MARPOL Convention. For
the time being, four areas designated as ECAs, among them the
Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the North American EEZ and the
Californian Coast, have become SOx control areas, which ef-
fectively means that the maximum sulphur content of the fuel
oils loaded, bunkered and used onboard vessels in these areas
should currently not exceed 1.00% m/m and should be further
reduced 0.10% m/m after 1 January 2015, a very ambitious tar-
get in comparison to 3.50% global cap applicable worldwide (at
least until 2020). Consequently, ECAs will also feature more
stringent standards for NOx and PM emissions. MARPOL An-
nex VI NOx reduction scheme foresees three different levels of
control (so-called tiers) applied, based on the ship’s construc-
tion date. Whereas Tier II is applied to all vessels constructed
after 1.1.2011, the Tier III limits adopted in 2008 are to be ap-
plicable to ships built from 2016 when sailing in ECAs. In
2013 IMO decided to postpone the entry into force of the Tier
III NOx emissions limits for ship engines from 2016 to 2021.
The idea of defining certain sea areas as special areas - and
then provide them with a higher level of protection than other
areas of the sea - was inherent to MARPOL Convention straight
from its adoption in 1973. The designation of special areas in
made for reasons related to the oceanographical and ecological
conditions of the area, as well as to its shipping traffic patterns,
and presupposes the adoption of additional mandatory rules of
pollution prevention. Special areas can be adopted in relation
to MARPOL Annex I (oil pollution prevention), Annex II (pre-
vention of pollution by noxious liquid substances), Annex IV
(sewage pollution prevention), Annex V (garbage pollution pre-
vention). In addition to the recent Baltic ECA, the Baltic Sea
was previously designated by the MARPOL Convention as a
special area in terms of oil, sewage, garbage; this covers the
Baltic Sea proper with the Gulf of Bothnia, the Gulf of Finland
and the entrance to the Baltic Sea.
Apart from MARPOL special areas, in 2005 parts of the
Baltic Sea (excluding Russian territorial waters) were desig-
nated as a particularly sensitive sea area (PSSA). In practical
terms, a PSSA gives a possibility to introduce associated pro-
tective measures (APMs), including specific ways of control-
ling the maritime activities in the PSSA, such as routing mea-
sures, discharge and equipment requirements for ships. In addi-
tion to local instruments developed under the auspices of global
organisations, genuinely regional instruments play no less an
important role in elaborating the shipping governance structure
and equipping it with specific instruments. The 1992 Helsinki
Convention is a legal instrument developed to improve the sta-
tus of the Baltic Sea, i.a., addressing emissions and discharges
from maritime transport. Some of the provisions of the Helsinki
Convention go beyond global regulation, e.g., it has taken a pro-
gressive stance in matters of ballast water treatment, introduced
no-special-fee system for port reception facilities, and covered
the whole Baltic Sea area by land-based AIS monitoring sys-
tems. Moreover, traffic separation schemes, mandatory ship re-
porting systems (GOFREP, BELTREP, SOUNDREP, GDAN-
REP), which require ships to submit a report to the designated
shore-based Vessel Traffic System Centre, deep water routing
and other instruments for enhancing the safety of maritime nav-
igation and improving vessels’ environmental performance are
a part of Baltic shipping governance system (a comprehensive
list of these instruments can be derived from Table 2).
Apart from the fact that the present system of shipping ex-
ternalities governance in the BSR is complex and multi-leveled,
it is also polycentric, meaning that it features multiple overlap-
ping and competing centers of decision-making and policy im-
plementation within a common overarching framework. The
design of legal provisions and other instruments allows one to
identify multiple actors involved into the Baltic shipping gover-
nance, embracing both public and private entities: (1) states (in
terms of regulatory and implementation capacity divided into
”flag”, ”port” and ”coastal”); (2) inter-governmental organisa-
tions (IMO, HELCOM, Paris MOU); (3) oversight agents (ma-
rine insurers, P&I clubs, classification societies, vetting inspec-
tions); (4) maritime industry (vessel-owners/operators, man-
agement, agents, chartering, professional - e.g., bunkering -
and shipping association); (5) shippers (cargo-owners) and con-
sumer markets; (6) civil society, NGOs, coastal community.
From the brief discussion above, it follows that the Baltic ECA
will be implemented in a region where complex a multi-leveled
and polycentric shipping governance structure already exists.
How will the introduction of the Baltic ECA affect the interac-
tions between these multiple actors (and vice versa)? And what
would be the added value of this new instrument in terms of the
overall challenges to governance of shipping externalities?
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4.2. Instrumentation of the Baltic Shipping Governance
As the new ECA is being put ’on top’ of the existing gover-
nance system, in order to be able to assess its implications, the
structure and process of shipping externalities governance be-
fore ECA’s introduction needs to be understood. The involve-
ment of different actors can be traced when analysing the ship-
ping governance mix in terms of its instruments (Annex I). Bas-
ing itself on the evidence from the BSR, this research analyzed
almost 30 of the most used instruments of shipping externali-
ties governance in terms of actors (targeted and implementing
bodies), governance mode, and mechanism (Table 1).
The findings of instrumentation analysis suggest that dif-
ferent forms of governance - ranging from governance - by -
government to governance-without-government as two extreme
cases - can be identified in the area. The embeddedness of these
forms varies, though it exhibits a systematic pattern: hierarchy
is more likely to be used for regulatory compliance, whereas
market coordination contributes more to the development of en-
abling environments for safe and environmental shipping. Fur-
ther analysis reveals that not all of the above-identified actors
are equally integrated into the implementation process. In legal
terms, negative environmental impacts of shipping are subject
to public international law (with exception of civil liability con-
ventions), thus, implementation is concentrated within the na-
tion states and is dependent on the translation of international
conventions into respective national legislation. The analysis
of these regulation shows that ship- owner/ operator is mostly
specified as a target of legislation (i.e., subject to standards, li-
able party), whereas other actors (ports, shippers) are seldom
involved.
A further insight from the instrumentation analysis relates
to the governance system in terms of modes and mechanisms.
The analysis shows that different instruments not only rely on
different actors, but also exploit different modes of coordination
(and consequentially require different mechanisms). Reflect-
ing the governance structures, hierarchical and market coordi-
nation / self-governance modes are most typically used. The
lack of negotiation and co-governance may be interpreted as
a sign of the weakness of networks in the maritime business.
The governance mechanisms explicate that in the ’shadow of
hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997) most of immediate implementation
is outsourced to regulatory agencies and private actors.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the instrumen-
tation analysis is that though maritime transport is inherently
an area that requires collective action, most of the governance
instruments fail in integrating all the relevant actors into the
governance process. As a result, the governance mix is largely
based in old-fashioned hierarchical modes of governance fea-
tured by command-and-control instruments animated by mech-
anisms of control and punishment. In those cases where a reg-
ulatory task is divided between public and private authority,
the role of private actors is reduced to public goods suppli-
ers, meaning that policy targets and contributions are decided
by public authority and implementation is outsourced to private
actors. Moreover, most instruments emphasize the enforcement
side of governance, leaving out the compliance side. Thereby
existing policy arrangements do not emphasize the participatory
dimension of governance, which limits the range and scope of
actors’ involvement and, as a result, actors may experience a
lack of commitment and little motivation to comply.
5. Discussion: The Potential of ECAs
The results of instrumentation analysis provide insights into
how the present system of externalities governance in shipping
is functioning, what the generic and specific mechanisms that
enable more environmental quality in shipping are, as well as
allowing for speculating on how change can be brought about
in the governance of shipping externalities. Whereas instru-
ments vary in scope and form, they do not account for the in-
herent polycentricity of shipping, as little or no links exist be-
tween different instruments to coordinate their effects and cre-
ate synergies between different types of arrangements. For ex-
ample, the demand of the IMO to adhere to such a technical
parameter as a double-hull requires classification societies to
inspect a vessel and notify the fact of a double-hull, which can
thereafter be monitored by port authorities during a PSC in-
spection. A different example - the demand of cargo-owners
to transport their goods with a vessel that adheres to environ-
mental quality standards - requires vessel-owners to be able
to present the corresponding documentation from classification
society, which, however, informs only on upholding the mini-
mum standards, but also from ISO certification or even private
certification schemes, such as Clean Shipping Index, which can
notify environmental performance beyond regulatory require-
ments. Finally, a demand of coastal communities to diminish
air pollution from vessels in harbours requires ports to provide
vessels with shore-side electricity, which will allow the abolish-
ing of energy-generation onboard, thus reducing air emissions.
This means that improvement of inter- and intra-level coordi-
nation (e.g., through proliferation of maritime networks) is a
precondition for comprehensive development of shipping ex-
ternalities governance.
The integration of relevant stakeholders, based on strength-
ening the existing formal and informal maritime networks and
their inclusion into the governance process, thus seems to be
one of the key solutions to effective governance of shipping ex-
ternalities. The Baltic ECA can be expected to shift the mono-
centric features of the existing governance structure towards
recognition of other decision-making centres, thereby creating
new processes, new linkages and new responsibilities. The
emission reduction policies have been anticipated by the mar-
itime industry by active partaking in the discussion on how
the new ECA standards can be met. Below are two examples
of how activation of public discussion around the Baltic ECA
infused change in the balance of power among the industry’s
stakeholders.
Firstly, the Baltic ports recently seem to have realised their
potential in the emission mitigation process, which will sub-
sequently shift their role in the governance process (Gritsenko
and Yliskyla¨-Peuralahti, 2013). On the one hand, ports are in-
volved in the creation of a compliance-friendly infrastructure
to help shipping meet the new operational requirements (e.g.,
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shore-side electricity, availability of compliant fuels, reception
of SCR waste). On the other hand, ports seek to raise their
own environmental profiles and the attractiveness of shipping
as an environmentally-friendly mode of transport by acting as
environmental pioneers and leaders of change, welcoming new
technology and giving incentives for compliance (e.g., reduc-
tion on port duties). Thus, the establishment of a new ECA can
be seen as a motivator to re-consider and re-negotiate the roles
of certain actors in the governance process.
Secondly, the shipping companies operating in the BSR have
been anchoring the new ECA requirements in their corporate
social responsibility (CSR) policies. Cutting air emissions be-
fore the new regulation came into force has become a part of the
corporate responsibility profile of e.g., Maersk and Wallenius
Wilhelmsen, which emphasized their willingness to contribute
to the development of sustainable supply chains (Yliskyla¨ - Peu-
ralahti and Gritsenko, 2014). However, CSR is not limited to
emission mitigation, and has the potential to improve the con-
nections between the actors within the maritime industry as
well as within the supply chains by bringing more transparency
and accountability into shipping operations. CSR can be seen as
a substantially new way of approaching the externalities prob-
lem and the establishment of ECAs can prompt consolidation
of CSR implementation in these areas.
Eventually, ECAs can strengthen the spatial element in ship-
ping externalities governance. Whereas shipping is usually re-
garded as a globalized industry that requires overarching global
solutions, most types of pollution from maritime shipping are
embedded in a certain time and space and their negative ship-
ping externalities are subject to spatial and temporal variability.
Thus, the instrument of ECAs recognises local potential to deal
with adverse impacts from shipping, despite the trans-boundary
nature of air emissions, which do not respect administrative bor-
ders.
6. Conclusion
Contemporary shipping lacks a governance system that
would recognise that shipping quality governance is an inher-
ently polycentric endeavor and no actor on its own can en-
sure that external cost is not passed onto the third parties. The
central problem of the current global architecture for shipping
governance is its focus on public hierarchical forms of gov-
ernance, neglecting the ever-growing multi-actor engagement.
The de facto existing links connecting the private and public
forms of governance are not institutionalised and do not pro-
vide credible future commitments for any of the governing ac-
tors. The attempts to enhance compliance of vessels by intro-
ducing complex monitoring and inspection procedures led by
the state authorities, regional attempts to create a ”trend” for
clean/green shipping within the maritime industry, as well as
self-regulatory schemes developed within the maritime indus-
try remained largely disintegrated. The important producers of
public goods associated with quality in shipping, for example,
the coastal states, ports and shippers, are not adequately inte-
grated into the governance system.
Since the existing governance does not adequately mirror
the interactive and polycentric processes underlying real-life
maritime activities, the inadequate outcomes in the struggle for
quality shipping are not surprising. Yet, the broad variety of
instruments aimed at governing the external cost from shipping
indicates a salience among the actors that the issue requires sys-
tematic attention. In this situation the instrument of ECAs has a
potential to aid coordination problems as it puts emphasis upon
the existence of local solutions and reveals problem-solving po-
tential concentrated within the maritime networks in the ECA
regions.
The proliferation of ECAs can create a precedent for re-
visions in the current governance system, as their demanding
requirements underline the fact that the problems of shipping
externalities require collective action and without cooperation
between ship owners, ports, shippers, authorities, technology
suppliers and other maritime actors conditions necessary for
meeting the ECA standards cannot be established
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